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ABSTRACT
Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large
banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking “too-big-to-
fail” or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets.  But resolving swap
positions at insolvent banks, particularly a bank’s out-of-the-money positions, has received
less attention.   The FDIC can now either repudiate these contracts and treat the in-the-
money counterparties as at-risk general creditors or transfer the contracts to a solvent bank.
Both options have major drawbacks.  Terminating contracts abruptly may result in large-
fire sale losses and ignite defaults in other swap contracts.  Transferring the contracts both
is costly to the FDIC and protects the counterparties, who would otherwise be at-risk and
monitor their banks.  This paper proposes a third option that keeps the benefits of both
options but eliminates the undesirable costs.    It permits the contracts to be transferred,
thus avoiding the potential for fire-sale losses and adverse spillover, but keeps the insolvent
bank’s in-the-money counterparties at-risk, thus maintaining discipline on banks by large
and sophisticated creditors.
*John F. Smith Professor of Finance and Economics, Loyola University Chicago and
Consultant, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago1
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I. Introduction
        Recent research and experience suggest that federal bank regulators in the United
States can resolve on-balance sheet activities of even large insolvent banks efficiently
without either protecting uninsured deposits, so that their owners remain at-risk and
monitor and discipline their banks, or causing serious harm to other banks or financial
markets.  In addition, the flexibility of regulators to protect uninsured depositors by
invoking the systemic risk exemption (SRE) to the least cost resolution provision in the
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) - - formerly known as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) - - has
been greatly reduced.  But less attention has been devoted to resolving  some other - - so
called “off-balance sheet” - -  activities of these banks, particularly their out-of-the-money
swap positions.
1  These represent creditor claims on the bank.
Because there is widespread fear that rapid close-outs of swap contracts at large
banks may result in large fire-sale losses that could trigger defaults on other swap contracts
used to hedge the initial contracts and threaten the stability of financial markets, there is a
perception that in resolving insolvent larger banks regulators will transfer such positions to
                                                
* Earlier, briefer, and more preliminary versions of this proposal appear in Kaufman 2001 and 2002.  I am
indebted to William Bergman, Robert Bliss, Richard Carnell, Christian Johnson, Michael Krimminger, James
Moser, Robert Steigerwald and participants at a seminar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for helpful
comments and discussions. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s, and should not be construed as
positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Another “off-balance sheet” activity that recently appears to have caused the FDIC a problem in resolutions
is securitized credit card portfolios (Blackwell, 2002).2
other, solvent banks rather than terminating the contracts.  As a result, the insolvent bank’s
in-the-money counterparties would now have claims on the solvent banks and be protected
against any losses charged other creditors of the insolvent bank.  But, because such a
strategy is likely to violate the requirements of least cost resolution, it may require invoking
SRE.   Moreover, if this occurs, an important group of large and sophisticated bank
creditors are effectively removed from monitoring and disciplining banks. This paper
develops a modest but realistic third option proposal for resolving these positions
efficiently without requiring either abrupt terminations of the positions or protection of the
bank’s in-the-money counterparties.  If adopted, the proposal should enhance the ability of
regulators to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently.
Efficient resolution of insolvent large and complex banks involves resolving them
at lowest direct cost to the FDIC and lowest indirect spillover cost to other banks or
financial markets, i.e., minimize adverse externalities.  Such a resolution structure should
include two important features.  One, it should provide sufficient time to unwind the
activities of these banks, including their large portfolios of off-balance sheet futures,
options, forwards and swap positions, in an orderly fashion by the date of resolution with
sufficiently small, if any, fire-sale losses that would not unduly disrupt financial markets
nor cause doubts about the financial health of otherwise solvent banks.  Two, it should
permit large, sophisticated uninsured depositors and other creditors, including
uncollateralized off-balance sheet counterparties, to be put at-risk and share in any potential
losses with the FDIC, so as to incentize market monitoring and discipline by these
stakeholders.  In recent statements, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has
indicated that achieving a solution that satisfies both conditions is desirable.  He has stated
that:3
II.   Current FDIC Resolution Procedures
Unlike other corporations, including bank holding companies, that file for
bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code and are resolved by the bankruptcy courts, banks are
declared insolvent by their chartering or primary federal regulatory agency and resolved by
the FDIC, which is generally appointed as receiver or conservator, under the provisions of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.   FDICIA effectively requires that, among other things,
examiners / supervisors / regulators become progressively more familiar with a bank’s
financial condition as its capital ratio declines through a series of five prespecified capital
tripwires for implementing prompt corrective action (PCA).  Thus, by the time or shortly
after a bank reaches the lowest capital tranche and becomes classified as “critically
undercapitalized” and requires resolution, the primary regulatory agency and the FDIC
should, except in the cases of major fraud or misrepresentation, be sufficiently familiar
with the bank both to identify the eligible insured depositors and to estimate the market or
recovery value of its assets.
2  This arrangement also allows the regulators to prepare the
necessary information for speedy distribution to potential bidders for the bank or its assets.
To gain additional time to complete the resolution and reduce discontinuities in the
provision of banking services, U.S. banks are generally declared legally insolvent by their
chartering or primary federal regulator at the end of business on Thursdays or Fridays.  All
the issue is an organization that is very large is not too big to
fail, it may be too big to allow to implode quickly.  But
certainly, none are too big to orderly liquidate…What you want
to avoid is the quick reaction.  And that we can do.  But not to
protect shareholders.  And presumably, not to protect non-
guaranteed deposits from loss (Greenspan, 2000, p. 14)…  The
potential for greater market discipline at large institutions is
substantial (Greenspan, 2001, p. 7).4
or some of the assets are then sold and the deposits either assumed by another bank upon
payment by the FDIC or paid out on the following Monday.  To the extent that the
insolvent bank has remaining franchise value, all or most of the good assets are likely to be
purchased and most employees retained by the bank that assumed, at least, the insured
deposits.  Thus, disruptions to customer-loan relationships are minimized.
3   In addition,
unlike in most other countries, the FDIC frequently advances payment on both insured and
uninsured deposits, at this time, particularly for larger banks.  The accounts are not frozen.
Insured deposits are available in full on Monday either in the form of a deposit at an
assuming bank or paid out at a paying agent.  At or about the same time, uninsured
depositors and other creditors received receivership certificates specifying their claims on
the recovery value of the assets.  In cases where the bank’s assets and liabilities can be
valued reasonably accurately, the FDIC will frequently pay the depositors an advance
dividend on the certificates of the approximate present value of the prorata share of the
estimated recovery amount (Kaufman and Seelig, 2002).
4  Thus, there is little loss of
liquidity to these depositors.
5   In addition, if necessary for large complex banks the FDIC
can charter a temporary bridge bank to gain additional time to unwind the bank with
minimum fire-sale losses and without disrupting ongoing banking relationships.  Such a
bank can assume whatever proportion of uninsured deposits and other liabilities as well as
assets that the FDIC wishes to transfer to it.  Thereafter, all liabilities are fully protected
until the bridge bank is resolved (Bovenzi, 2002).
                                                                                                                                                   
2 At the country’s largest banks, the regulators maintain a permanent on-site supervisory presence.
3 Berger and Udell (2002) report evidence that customer-loan relationships are as often with particular loan
officers as with the bank. To the extent the loan officers are maintained by the successor bank, any disruption
in loan servicing as a result of a bank failure is reduced.
4 The uninsured depositors also receive a claim on the FDIC as receiver for the bank for any prorata amount
that the actual recovery value realized exceeds the amount advanced.  Additional payments occur frequently
because the FDIC typically advances only a conservative estimate of the recovery value to reduce its chances
of loss. If the FDIC overestimates the recovery value and advances too much in retrospect, it absorbs the loss.5
 Nevertheless, some liabilities of large banks, in particular swap and other
derivative positions, present regulators with particularly challenging problems in
resolutions.  Hasty unwinding of the positions is widely perceived to both trigger large fire-
sale losses and, because these positions are frequently hedged by the counterparties with
other derivative positions with other counterparties, affect a large number of parties along a
chain.  For example, the potential widespread disorderly conditions resulting from rapid
unwinding of such a large portfolio upon termination or close-out resulting from a default
by a counterparty was a major reason underlying the Federal Reserve intervention in
LTCM in 1998.
6
Individual swap agreements with the same counterparty are  provided special
treatment as “qualified financial contracts” (QFCs) in the bank resolution code and
permitted to be netted.
7  These contracts are typically incorporated in a master swap
agreement and netted, so that only the net of the position with a single counterparty is at-
risk.  An insolvent bank may have net swap positions that are either or both in-the-money -
- so that they are assets to the bank - - or out-of-the-money - - so that they are in-the-money
to the bank’s counterparties and a liability to the bank.  If the net positions of the insolvent
bank are in-the-money, they provide no special problem to the FDIC in resolution.  Similar
                                                                                                                                                   
5 In addition, as discussed later, the FDC sets off uninsured deposits against any outstanding performing loan
amounts the respective depositor may have at the bank, so that these depositors effectively retain access to the
par value of their deposits up to the amount of the outstanding loan.
6 On the other hand, the rapid unwinding of Enron’s complex derivative portfolio in 2001 did not appear to
have major adverse effects on the market.
7 Unlike the bankruptcy code, which generally prohibits netting, netting is explicitly authorized for depository
institutions for off-balance sheet securities legally declared “qualified financial contracts” in the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, which amended the FDI Act.  The
authority was broadened and enforcement strengthened in FDICIA in 1991.  Somewhat weaker provisions for
swap agreements were authorized for nonbanks in a 1990 amendment to the bankruptcy code and proposal for
bringing them into line with those for banks have been introduced in Congress and are awaiting enactment.
Netting provisions are strongly supported by the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators.  The major
argument for netting is that it will reduce systemic risk (Bliss, 2002;  FDICIA, 1991; and Ireland, 1999.)  The
major argument against netting is that it violates the usual priorities in liquidation, as it fails to reduce the
value of the claim on the failed counterparty by the prorata loss.  The solvent counterparties are effectively
protected against loss up to the nettable amounts.  Thus, they move up in priority.  Any losses incurred are
shifted to the remaining unsecured counterparties, including uninsured depositors and the FDIC.6
to other assets, the FDIC can sell the net positions to other (third party) solvent
counterparties at market value. But, if the positions are out-of-the-money, the solvent
counterparties have claims on the bank and the FDIC needs to consider how to treat these
claims in resolution.  And this may not be independent of the way the FDIC disposes of the
positions.
The FDIC may currently pursue one of two options in resolving the counterparties’
in-the-money swap positions of insolvent large banks.    It receives an automatic one
business day stay after its appointment as receiver to make a determination of its actions.
8
It can repudiate the net contracts, effectively terminating and closing them out.
9   If the net
positions are not collateralized, the in-the-money claimants are treated as general creditors
of the insolvent bank and subject to potential pro-rata losses (haircuts) on their claim based
on the recovery value of the bank’s assets.  They receive no special treatment.  But, as
noted above, abrupt closeouts may set off an undesirable chain reaction.  Thus, there may
be strong incentive for the FDIC to avoid a rapid closeout of an insolvent bank’s swap
positions.  Instead, it has the legal authority during the stay to transfer the bank’s out-of-
the-money portfolio of each counterparty to a solvent bank counterparty.  The contracts are
not close out.
10  The in-the-money counterparties now have a claim on the new out-of-the-
money counterparty. This protects the insolvent bank’s in-the-money swap counterparties
against loss and treats them differently than other creditors.   Because, the bank’s positions
are out-of-the-money, the FDIC will assume the loss in the transfer and need to pay the
assuming party the current market value of the net position. Thus, depending on what other
                                                
8 The appointment of a receiver does not, per se, represent a default and cause for contract termination.  If the
FDIC  does  not  act  on  the contracts  within  the stay period,   the  solvent  counterparties can  terminate  the
contracts. (Krimminger, 1998, Simmons, 2001). If the FDIC is appointed as a conservator, the stay for
termination by the counterparty for contracts not repudiated or transferred is longer.
9 Methods for valuing terminated contracts are discussed in Ronalds, 2002.  If valued incorrectly because of
haste, remedies exist for later correction.
10 As Krimminger (1998, p.10) notes, transfer “allows the conservator or receiver the opportunity to preserve
the value of such contracts, while permitting counterparties to maintain valuable hedge transactions.”7
parties the FDIC protects, at least part of the loss is shifted to the FDIC and represents a
“bailout.”   This resolution  is not a LCR and can require invoking SRE.
11
  Although avoiding potential adverse spillover, by not putting these counterparties
at risk, an important group of large and sophisticated creditors is removed from monitoring
the credit risk of their banks and potentially disciplining them in support of the uninsured
depositors.  In addition, if their solvent swap counterparties do not view themselves at risk,
the ability of insolvent or near-insolvent banks to increase their risk exposure quickly and
gamble for resurrection is greatly facilitated.  Thus, neither the close-out nor the bailout
resolution strategy appears optimal.
III.    A Proposed Third Alternative
If there is serious concern about major adverse externalities both from a rapid
unwinding of large bank out-of-the-money swap and other similar liability positions in a
closeout and from protecting bank in-the-money swap counterparties, so that neither of the
above two options appear optimal, a third resolution option - - a simulated closeout - - may
be preferable.  In this strategy, as in the full protection option, the net swap positions are
not closed out at resolution, but are transferred by the FDIC to a solvent assuming party
with compensation at market value.   But, unlike in the full protection option, the net in-
the-money counterparties are charged a fee (haircut) by the FDIC equivalent to the loss rate
applied to other at-risk stakeholders of the insolvent bank of the same priority class.
12  The
payment is made concurrently in a separate transaction.   If the bank’s assets are sold at
their booked market values, this is the same loss rate as the in-the-money counterparties
                                                
11 In a SRE resolution, the FDIC can protect the bank’s in-the-money swap counterparties without having to
protect other, even higher priority classes of  uninsured claims, such as uninsured deposits (Bovenzi, 2002).
Because  the counterparties are protected against loss, it is unlikely that they will choose to terminate their
contracts after the stay has ended.  The computation of LCR involves assumptions about losses from fire-
sales and may provide wiggle room for regulators to defend protecting swap counterparties when they want
to. (Bennett, 2001).
12 The solvent in-the-money counterparties can, of course, protect themselves against loss by maintaining a
zero net position or overcollateralizing their positions.8
would suffer in a closeout and they should be no worse off.   The out-of-the-money QFC
portfolio is transferred at its non-credit impaired market value either to a solvent assuming
bank or, if additional time is required to resolve the bank, to a newly chartered bridge bank.
The loss charged the affected in-the-money counterparties would be paid directly to the
FDIC at the date of resolution in a separate payment and is effectively passed through to
the assuming out-of-the money party.  There is no FDIC bailout.    Because the FDIC does
not incur a cost and the counterparties are not protected, SRE need not be invoked.
This treatment of solvent net in-the-money insolvent bank swap counterparties is
effectively comparable to the treatment of the on-balance sheet uninsured depositors at
insolvent banks, except that for them the loss reduces the value of their claim rather than
generating a separate payment.  The same provisions for over-and under-estimates
currently applied by the FDIC to advance dividend payments to uninsured depositors could
be applied to the payments made by to the FDIC by the in-the-money swap counterparties.
If the loss charged was, in retrospect, too large - - the FDIC underestimated the recovery
value - -, the FDIC reimburses the counterparties.  If the loss charged was too small, the
FDIC absorbs the loss.  Thus, the FDIC is likely to make a conservative estimate and
overcharge the counterparties until the final settlement.  But closeout prices are also likely
to go against the in-the-money counterparties at the termination date and, if there are
disagreements, the final prices are typically settled at a later date.  As there is no close-out,
the entire swap portfolio is maintained intact and is either not unwound until maturity or
unwound earlier in an orderly and nondisruptive fashion.  Any potential adverse affects of
unwinding a portfolio quickly would be removed, but market discipline by these large and
assumed sophisticated counterparties  is maintained.  This procedure appears to be
consistent with the requirement of least cost resolution that9
IV.      The T-Account Basics of the Three Strategies
The basic operation of the above proposal as well as the differences with those of
resolving swap positions either through immediate closeout liquidation or by protecting an
insolvent bank’s in-the-money counterparties fully against loss can be demonstrated with
the help of simple T accounts.  Assume initially that at the date of resolution large Bank A
has assets valued at market at $80, insured deposits valued at par at $40, uninsured deposits
valued at par at $50, and counterparties’ net in-the-money uncollateralized swap liabilities
valued at market at $10.  There are no other creditors.  Thus, the bank’s net worth is $–20
and it is, at least, market value insolvent.  This balance sheet is shown in Figure 1.  Assume
also the existence of depositor preference, so that depositors and the FDIC have legal
preference over the swap counterparties, who are general creditors.  The FDIC is appointed
receiver.
1.  Bank sale or liquidation and swap closeouts with no protection to uninsured claimants
The FDIC sells the assets of the bank at their booked market value of $80 and
closes out (repudiates) the out-of-the-money swap position without further loss.  Insured
depositors are paid in full.  Uninsured depositors and the in-the-money swap counterparties
receive receivership certificates.    The first $10 loss is charged to the swap counterparties,
totally eliminating their claim.  The remaining $10 loss is charged against deposits, both
the uninsured and insured, with the FDIC standing in the shoes of the insured depositors.
This amounts to an 11 percent ($10/90) loss rate for both classes of deposits.  The
the total amount of expenditures by the
Corporation…(including any…contingent
liability for future payment by the
Corporation)…is the least costly to the deposit
insurance fund of all possible methods
(FDICIA 1991, p.41).10
uninsured deposits lose $5.55 and the FDIC, $4.45 to protect the insured deposits.
Shareholders receive nothing.  The resulting balance sheet is shown in Figure 2.  For the
sake of simplicity, the FDIC’s loss is shown as a cash infusion.
This is a LCR strategy.  It also has the advantage that all uninsured claimants are ex-
ante at-risk and therefore incentized to monitor and discipline their banks.   The strategy
has the disadvantage that the abrupt closeout of the swap position could cause a fire-sale
loss to the counterparties that may ignite adverse spillover effects in financial markets as
other positions are forced to be closed out with potential fire-sale losses.
2.  Bank sale or liquidation and swap sales with full protection to uninsured claimants.
The FDIC is permitted to invoke SRE and protect some or all uninsured depositor
and creditor claims, including the net in-the-money swap positions.   The assets are again
sold at their booked values.  But, the out-of-the-money swap positions are not closed out.
The entire portfolio is transferred to solvent assuming parties.  The assuming out-of-the-
money counterparties are paid the $10 market price by the FDIC to assume the liability.
The in-the-money counterparties now have a claim on the new solvent out-of-the-money
counterparties and are thus protected against the insolvency loss.   In this strategy, the
entire $20 loss is shifted to the uninsured depositors and the FDIC.
SRE appears to grant the FDIC the authority to protect all uninsured depositors and
creditors or either uninsured depositors or creditors, regardless of depositor preference
requirements.  In Figure 3A, unsecured creditors (swap counterparties) are protected fully
and insured depositors are not.  The $20 loss is thus shared proportionately between the
uninsured depositors and the FDIC.  Both suffer a loss rate of 22 percent.  The $10 FDIC
payment to the new solvent bank swap counterparty is shown as a decline in the insolvent
bank’s initial assets and the FDIC share of the loss as a $9 cash infusion.   In Figure 3B,
both creditors and insured depositors are protected and the entire $20 insolvency loss is11
borne by the FDIC.  The larger FDIC losses in both examples relative to Figure 2 reflects
the permissible violation of LCR.
The primary advantage of this strategy is that the swap positions are not abruptly
closed out with potential adverse spillover or systemic risk effects.  The primary
disadvantage is that, if the bailout is anticipated, there might be a larger loss to the FDIC
because large, presumed sophisticated swap creditors and possibly even uninsured
depositors are not put at ex-ante risk and encouraged to monitor and discipline their banks.
Thus, this strategy is likely to increase moral hazard risk taking by banks.
 3.  Bank sale or liquidation and swap sales with no protection to uninsured claimants.
       As in Alternative 1, the FDIC sells the bank’s assets at their booked price.  But,
unlike in Alternative 1, the out-of-the-money swap positions are not repudiated and closed
out.  Rather, as in Alternative 2, they are transferred to a solvent assuming third party at the
existing market price at a loss to the FDIC.  However, neither the in-the-money
counterparties nor the depositors are protected.  The swap counterparties are charged the
$10 loss which is collected in a separate payment, and the insured and uninsured deposits
are charged the remaining $10 loss proportionately.  This is shown in Figure 4.  The
liabilities and losses are the same as in Alternative 1 (Figure 2), but the asset side shows the
$10 FDIC payment to the new solvent out-of-the-money bank swap counterparties as a
decline in the insolvent bank’s initial assets and cash infusions of $10 by the in-the-money
counterparties and $5 by the FDIC to protect the insured deposits.  The resolution is a LCR.
  The advantages of this alternative are that, unlike Alternative 2, the swap
counterparties and other uninsured claimants remain at ex-ante risk, but adverse spillovers
from abrupt termination of the swap positions are avoided.  Yet the FDIC suffers no loss.
Both the FDIC and the in-the-money counterparties are no worse off than in Alternative 1.
The primary disadvantage of this strategy may be that its introduction may require new12
legislation to require bank swap counterparties to enter into the master agreement with the
FDIC.13
   Figure 1
   Bank A
   Initial Balance Sheet
Assets      $80
           
Total        80
$40     Insured deposits
  50     Uninsured deposits
  10     Net swaps
 -20     Net worth
           
  80      Total14
Figure 2
Balance Sheet after Terminating Swap Contracts and
 Loss-Sharing by All
Initial assets       $80
FDIC cash    5
           
Total           85
 
$40       Insured  deposits    
  45         Uninsured  deposits  
0      Net swaps    
    
 
 
   




Uninsured deposits     5.55
FDIC     4.45
Total $20.0015
Figure 3A
Balance Sheet after Transfer of Swap Contracts and
 Loss-Sharing by Uninsured Depositors and FDIC
Initial assets       $70
FDIC cash    9
             
Total           79
$40      Insured deposits
  39      Uninsured deposits
  0      Net swaps
           
       79      Total
Losses
Swap contracts $        0
Uninsured deposits    11.10
FDIC      8.90
Total  $20.0016
Figure 3B
Balance Sheet after Transfer of Swap Contracts and Total Loss Borne
by FDIC
Initial assets       $70
FDIC cash   20
           
Total         90
$40      Insured deposits
  50      Uninsured deposits
  0      Net swaps
           
       90      Total
Losses
Swap contracts $       0
Uninsured deposits          0
FDIC   20.00
Total $20.0017
Figure 4
Balance Sheet after Swap Transfer and Loss-Sharing by All
(No SRE)
Initial Assets       $70
Swap cash   10
FDIC cash     5
           
Total           85
$40      Insured deposits
  45      Uninsured deposits
  0      Net swaps
           
      85      Total
Losses
Swap contracts $10.00
Uninsured deposits     5.55
FDIC     4.45
Total $20.0018
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